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## **Introduction**

It is a truism that males both young and old commit a far greater number and variety of deviant or criminal acts than females (Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson 1985; Harris 1977; Heimer 1996; Miedzian 1991). Many theories take this as a given, whereas power-control attempts to explain at least some aspects of this phenomenon. Power-control theory appeals to many sociologists for this and several additional reasons. First, it attempts explicitly to bring macro- and micro-level explanations together: social structure, as represented by class structure and workplace conditions, is directly linked to power relationships and socialization practices in the household. Second, it meshes well with other theories such as self-control theory with its emphasis on the importance of risk-taking and impulsive behavior (Hagan 1989; Hirschi 1969). Third, it may be argued that it fits well with other perspectives on gender and crime, such as the liberation hypothesis and socialist-feminist and other feminist critiques of criminology (see especially Hagan 1989; Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991 for arguments counter to this; Simpson 1991; but see Simpson and Elis 1995).

The purpose of this study will be to empirically test power-control theory and a logical implication of the theory regarding gender role ideology. First, power-control theory and empirical tests and extensions as proposed by Hagan and his colleagues will be presented, followed by critiques and tests by others. Third will be a discussion of gender role attitudes in the production of delinquency, and how they relate to the power-control perspective. Fourth, I will present hypotheses derived from the previous three sections, then proceed to test power-control and the extension empirically using covariance structure models on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth mother and child files (Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State University).

### **1) Power-Control Theory: Basic Arguments**

Power-control theory explains the gender gap in delinquency by considering the roles of the parents in the workplace. Those with power and authority in the workplace are assumed to have power and authority in the household. Traditionally, males are more likely to hold authority positions in the workplace than females, and the ultimate expression of this power imbalance is what Hagan and his colleagues label the “patriarchal family” where the husband holds an authority position in the workplace and the wife does not work. The patriarchal family stands in contrast to the “egalitarian family” where both parents hold positions of authority, leading to an equal distribution of power in the household.

In the patriarchal family, daughters are closely controlled by their mothers, through both direct supervision (called “instrumental control”) and emotional bonding (called “relational control”). In such families, sons are given much greater freedom relative to daughters, and these different levels of control lead to large gender differences in preferences for risky activities and delinquency. In the egalitarian family, boys and girls receive more equal levels of control, leading to more similar outcomes regarding taste for risk and delinquency.

Hagan and his colleagues argue that tastes for risky activities are developed in order to foster entrepreneurial and executive skills requisite for holding positions of power and authority in the workplace. Although risk-taking encourages these skills useful in command positions, it also leads to minor forms of lawbreaking as a “quest for thrills” or a chance to pursue adult pleasures that are legally forbidden to minors. Thus, control over boys is reduced in the patriarchal home in preparation for their expected command

roles in the workplace, and increased control over girls prepares them for more domestic and subservient positions -- thereby producing large gender differences in delinquency as a byproduct.

Some (Keel 1998 among others) have criticized power-control as merely a restatement of the simplistic "liberation hypothesis" which effectively states that as females gain equality with males in other activities such as politics and labor-force outcomes, their motivation and opportunities for crime will also increase, reducing the gender gap in crime (Adler 1975; Simon 1975). The liberation hypothesis has been widely criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988; Lieber, Farnworth, Jamieson, and Nalla 1994; Messerschmidt 1986; Steffensmeier 1993; Steffensmeier and Allen 1996), and clearly is unappealing to those who would seek to promote gender equality in the labor-force and other spheres of social life. However, it is important to note here that power-control theory applies just to "common delinquency" or non-serious acts, such as drinking, smoking, petty theft, or curfew violations associated with a taste for risky activities, *not* to more serious forms of crime; it is *not* expected to apply to the forms of serious crimes where the gender gap is the largest. This is at once a strength of the theory, in that it pre-specifies the types of behavior to which it is addressed, and a limitation, in that much juvenile crime, especially that of most concern to policymakers, is beyond its scope.

## **2) Evolution of the Theory**

Power-control theory as first proposed by Hagan and his colleagues (Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1979), focused on the class location of the family vis-à-vis society as a whole. It used a neo-Marxian measure of class, derived from the work of Wright and Perrone (Wright and Perrone 1977), specifying four categories: employers, managers, workers, and the surplus population. Effectively, gender stratification in the workplace is taken as a given, in that boys in the highest classes are being prepared for roles of power and authority, whereas females in all classes and boys in the lower classes are being prepared for subservient roles. Thus, it is not increased control of daughters which is the source of gender differences in delinquency, but rather freedom from control among males. "What a power-control theory of common delinquent behavior is saying is that in all classes males are freer to deviate than females, but it is in the most powerful classes that males are freest to deviate" (Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985, pg. 1156-1157).

In later versions of the theory, Hagan and his colleagues (Hagan 1989; Hagan 1990; Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1987), use a more complex classification regarding the class location of *spouses* relative to each other. In this version, it is not just the power structure of the workplace that is being reproduced, but that of the household, thus tying the theory more concretely to gender relations and allowing a more complex set of predictions. Relying on the assumption that power in the workforce translates to power in the home, working wives, especially in positions of authority, gain power in the household through their positions in the labor-force. Whenever the wife gains power *relative to* the husband, there will be smaller gender differences in controls of children, and thus smaller differences in tastes for risk and delinquency (Hagan 1989). Thus, egalitarian families and diminished gender differences in delinquency could be found in different classes. In this version, a manager-mother with manager-father household is equivalent to a working-mother with no husband -- the key is that there is no *imbalance* of power *within* the household. Note that it is an increased level of controls over *daughters* in the patriarchal home which is now the causal mechanism responsible for

gender differences in delinquency and related outcomes, not reduced control over sons (see especially Hagan 1989, p. 153-154).

In addition to these classifications based on authority in the workplace, Hagan et al. have used two additional ways to differentiate households which capture power relations and gender role attitudes. In "Clarifying and Extending," power in the household was determined by mothers' responses to questions about which spouse decides where to live, where to go on vacation, whether she should work, and whether to move if the husband were to get a job offer in another city (although in their analyses, they used only the item regarding deciding if the wife was to work) (Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson 1990). In "Risk Preferences and Patriarchy," the authors use two classification systems, occupational and attitudinal (Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell, and Arneklev 1996). The "attitudinal" measure of patriarchy was composed of nine retrospective items tapping subjects' perceptions of their parents' attitudes towards women working. In this version, they designated as patriarchal those families that were patriarchal as determined by the occupational structure *and* were above the mean on the attitudinal measure, while all other families were considered egalitarian. Thus, these later papers point in the direction of a more nuanced process of recreating gender, authority, and class relations and begin to make explicit the social-psychological or ideological components of the theory which were previously implicit.

In the most complete explication of the theory, *Structural Criminology*, Hagan discusses three levels of the theory. "These include, in order of level of abstraction, *social-psychological processes* involving the adolescents whose behaviors we wish to explain, *social positions* consisting of the gender and delinquency roles in which the adolescents are located, and the class *structures* by which families are socially organized"[italics in the original] (Hagan 1989, pg. 151). Other authors (e.g. Heimer 1995; Heimer 1996) point out the need to develop further the "social psychological mechanisms underlying the relationship between gender and delinquency," focusing on the attitudes and beliefs of adolescents. However, I would argue that it is also important to consider such processes regarding the attitudes and beliefs of the *parents*, since in the power-control perspective, it is their behavior in imposing controls which is assumed to be causal of the behavior of the adolescents.

### **3) Empirical Tests and Extensions of Power-Control**

Tests of power-control performed by its originators were largely supportive of its predictions, using tables of means disaggregated by household class and gender, and regression or structural equations models on samples disaggregated by household class with gender entered as a dummy variable. Gender differences in delinquency and risk preferences were found to be greater in patriarchal families than in egalitarian ones, and these significant mean differences in delinquency between boys and girls were reduced to insignificance once parental controls were introduced (Hagan 1989; Hagan 1990; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1990; Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 1987). The perspective also was extended to include risk preferences by adults and non-delinquent adolescent phenomena such as thoughts of suicide and running away from home (Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996; Hagan 1990). However, other scholars have been critical of this line of research. Authors have pointed out theoretical and empirical shortcomings of research on power-control (see especially Lieber and Watcker 1997; Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991; Simpson and Elis 1995), and tests of the theory have "yielded mixed results" (Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996; Lieber and Watcker 1997). The following discussion is not meant to be a complete

survey of all tests and criticisms of power-control, but rather, to examine some major ones in order to see common themes and useful extensions.

A common criticism of tests of power-control theory performed by Hagan and his associates (see especially Jensen and Thompson 1990; Lieber and Watcker 1997; Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991) concerns their samples, which were composed generally of Toronto youth (Hagan 1989; Hagan 1990; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1990; Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 1987). After testing power-control on multiple, more representative samples, Jensen and Thompson (1990) were especially critical of the theory, stating that "there was no evidence of patterned class-gender variations of the sort reported [by Hagan and his associates]," although Hagan and his colleagues strongly defended themselves by in turn criticizing the ways in which class had been operationalized in Jensen and Thompson's work (Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1990).

Hill and Atkinson (1988) focus on two problems with the theory. Despite aspects of their study which make it of limited use as an explicit *test* of power-control, their problems, approach, and findings are of interest.<sup>1</sup> First, they ask the question "Where does the preference for risk come from?" (Hill and Atkinson 1988, page 132). Second, they question the operationalization of controls by Hagan and his colleagues, in that tests of the theory (up to that point) had incorporated only instrumental controls, such as questions regarding parents' knowledge of where the child was and who he or she was with but not relational or affective controls. Perhaps most importantly, they point out that differences occur in the *responses* of boys and girls to similar experiences, and that parenting techniques such as social control efforts may differ across gender by *type*, not merely by *level*. In particular, they predict that control of boys may be more through authority relations or instrumental controls, and that of girls may be through emotional or relational controls. Based on these expected interactions between gender and type of control, they modeled the genders separately. Thus, Hill and Atkinson's models are able to examine gender differences in the *effect* of the variables in the models, while those by Hagan et al. examine gender differences in the *levels* of the variables.<sup>2</sup> As expected, the types and effects of control of boys and girls differed (although not as a simple instrumental-relational split), emphasizing the necessity for modeling the genders separately or examining interactions between gender and other independent variables.

Singer and Levine's (1988) replication effort using the "class in the household" version of the theory also has findings which complicate and in some ways contradict power-control. Although the authors find the expected relationships among controls, risk preferences, and delinquency, the gender-delinquency relationship is actually *stronger* in balanced households than in unbalanced. The introduction of a measure of *group* risk preferences along with individual risk preferences seems to bring their findings into line with power-control, in that girls in unbalanced households are more susceptible to peer influences than those in balanced households, and boys in balanced households are more susceptible than those in unbalanced -- the introduction of taste for group risks drops gender to insignificance in all but the most patriarchal families, the husband

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<sup>1</sup> Their empirical analysis does not include measures of class or patriarchy, and thus it could be argued that it misses much of the point of power-control. Secondly, their measure of delinquency was a twenty item scale which included such items of serious criminality as strong-arm robbery, and therefore was possibly inappropriate for a test of power-control, which they acknowledge (Hill and Atkinson 1988).

<sup>2</sup> This distinction will be returned to frequently, though few papers are able to integrate the two types of effects. See Heimer (1995), Heimer and De Coster (1999) and Bartusch and Matsueda (1996) for models of both levels and effects in explaining the gender gap in delinquency. Although these papers are not explicitly power-control, they are dealing with the same phenomenon, and have relevance.

command/wife unemployed (Singer and Levine 1988, table three). They interpret this as suggesting "gender-specific sub-cultural responses to family class structures" indicative of resistance to the family authority structure by replacing parental influence with peer influence (Singer and Levine 1988, pg. 643-644). That is, boys may resist maternal influence in the balanced household through delinquent peer identification, while girls may resist paternal domination in the patriarchal household through delinquent peer identification.

In Morash and Chesney-Lind's (1991) "Reformulation and Partial Test of the Power-control Theory of Delinquency," the authors mention several criticisms. They note potential problems with combining all forms of single mother families which "leads to concern with separating the effects of family structure from those of social class" (Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991, pg. 350). That is, by considering single mother households to be homogeneous, there may be effects of class within that category; furthermore, the effects which are attributed to the egalitarian nature of such households may be due to other effects of family structure such as resources available. They also attempt to directly model the parental expectations for children's educational and labor-market outcomes which are implicit as motivating differential treatment of sons and daughters. For example, parents may have reasons such as desires to restrict sexual activity of daughters which operate regardless of intentions to prepare children for positions of authority in the workplace, or parents may have high expectations of sons and daughters regardless of the family power structure. Perhaps their most telling critique relevant to this paper is that they question the utility of current job status as the sole indicator of marital power and family class: "A woman's voluntary removal from the work force when children are young does not necessarily indicate a deterioration in her power, and measures not affected by such shifts (such as education and occupational prestige) should be considered. Further, because family social class is not used as a control variable, differences attributed to parental power actually may be a product of social class" (Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991, pg. 352). Empirically, their analysis showed little support for power-control, finding no relationship between the mother's occupational status and control over children or delinquency, and a *negative* relationship between family socioeconomic status and delinquency, the opposite of what power-control (at least in its earliest versions) would suggest. This finding of a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and delinquency in Morash and Chesney-Lind's analyses highlights a major issue regarding theoretical and empirical conceptualizations of family class structure and socioeconomic status. While the nature of the relationship (or lack of relationship) between socioeconomic status and delinquency is a very complex issue (see for example Simpson and Elis 1995; Tittle and Meier 1990), it would seem important to separate possible effects of social status vis-à-vis society as a whole from those of the power structure within the family, since a relationship between socioeconomic status and delinquency might confound the effects of family power structure.

#### **4) The Place of Gender Role Ideology**

Hagan states that "Power-control theory focuses on the social organization of gender relations. It is concerned with the ways in which gender relations are established, maintained, perpetuated, or in other words, reproduced." (Hagan 1989, pages 154-155). While gender relations as considered from traditional sociology focus on power, structural position, and the distribution of rewards and resources, feminist analyses attempt to make explicit the ideas and ideologies which help create, reinforce, and

reproduce these power relations. For example, “socialist feminists point to the important fact that when we engage in particular activities to satisfy needs, we also create a consciousness and personality structure (character structure) that endures beyond the social activities which shaped it” (Messerschmidt 1986, pages 30-31). While this paper will not be able to *fully* explore the relationships between personality structures and power structures, it hopes to begin to make such relationships an explicit part of the power-control perspective where they were previously implicit.

Research before and after the development of power-control has explored the importance of gender roles, identities, and the production of delinquency. Most has focused on the attitudes of the children themselves as the link between masculine or feminine roles and delinquency (Agnew and Brezina 1997; Avakame 1997; Dornfeld and Kruttschnitt 1992; Heimer 1995; Heimer 1996; Heimer and DeCoster 1999; Koita and Triplett 1998; Lieber, Farnworth, Jamieson and Nalla 1994; Mears, Ploeger, and Warr 1998; Messerschmidt 1986; Shover, Norland, James, and Thornton 1979; Singer and Levine 1988; Triplett and Jarjoura 1997). In this vein of research, traditional masculine roles are said to be associated with “self-confidence, independence, boldness, responsibility, competitiveness, a drive for dominance, and aggression/violence” and traditional feminine roles are associated with “patience, understanding, sensitivity, passivity, dependence, and nurturance/nonviolence” (quotations from Messerschmidt 1986, page 40, although similar statements are common in the works cited earlier in this paragraph.). To the extent that traditional definitions of gender are accepted by adolescents, they will behave in ways in concordance with them: Males who accept traditional definitions of masculinity may be more aggressive, impulsive, and delinquent, whereas females who accept traditional gender definitions are expected to be more respectful of laws and other individuals, and less delinquent (see especially Heimer 1996; Heimer and DeCoster 1999; Shover, Norland, James and Thornton 1979). Empirical and theoretical work has found traditional gender definitions among females and males affects delinquency only under some conditions, and that these effects and conditions themselves vary by gender (e.g. Dornfeld and Kruttschnitt 1992; Heimer 1996; Mears, Ploeger and Warr 1998). Further complicating this issue is that effects of gender attitudes may vary by *type* of criminal behavior (Heimer 1995). An additional difficulty in the study of gender attitudes, roles, and delinquency is that “studies have operationalized the central concept in diverse ways... some studies examine scales of masculine and feminine traits, others use sex-typed behavioral inventories, and yet others have blurred the distinction between familial controls and gender roles by including parental supervision as a measure of gender roles” (Heimer 1996, pg. 40).

Note that much of the theoretical work and all the empirical work has focused on the gender attitudes and roles among children, not those among parents. The attitudes of the mothers may be of particular relevance to a power-control model, as its core propositions concern differential controls being applied to children -- behaviors which, as noted before, are carried out by the parents, especially mothers. The power-control perspective holds that differential controls are imposed on children in an effort to replicate the family power structure of the household, but it is clear that such power structures are intertwined with social identities and preferences, such as attitudes regarding the place of women in society.

In short, it seems likely that those with beliefs supportive of a subordinate role for women will control daughters more closely, whereas those with more egalitarian beliefs will control sons and daughters more similarly, regardless of their spousal relations in the current generation. Thus, traditionally minded single mothers may produce a large gender gap in delinquency, whereas progressive housewives may produce a small gap.



The causal directions of the relations between ideology, power relations, and child outcomes are not simple; those with more traditional ideologies may sort themselves into situations conducive to patriarchal power relations, whereas those with less traditional role attitudes may seek more egalitarian situations. Thus, the effects of power structure and its accompanying ideological components may be difficult to disentangle; at this point, the question is simply to start to address the issue by examining the effects of gender role attitudes of mothers as well as family power structure.

### **The Current Analysis**

In the current analysis, I shall bring together the insights from the literature review, previous tests of power control, and my explication of the possible importance of mothers' gender role attitudes towards the study of delinquency. I will construct a dataset that is appropriate for an empirical analysis of power control and my extension, elaborate specific hypotheses derived from my discussions above, and then proceed to test these hypotheses using covariance structure models.

### **Data and Measures**

#### **a) Sample and Measures**

Data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Children of the NLSY. This is a sample of 6111 youth, "designed to be representative of the non-institutionalized civilian segment of American young people who were ages 14-21 in 1979" plus over-samples of African Americans, Hispanics, economically disadvantaged whites, and members of the armed forces (Zagorsky 1996). Data has been collected on the participants annually since 1979 and on the biological children of females in the sample in even numbered years since 1986, and is currently available through 1996. Attrition, though present, has been slight, and should not cause major problems. The economically disadvantaged whites and military oversamples were dropped from data collection in 1990, and are not used here.

The children currently available are therefore not nationally representative in two respects: the oversamples, and the age structure of births. The first may be adjusted for using child sampling weights *if* the entire sample is used; however, since the child self reports of delinquency and risk-taking are only administered to children of the appropriate ages, this is not a viable option in these analyses. The second is difficult as well – once the mothers are past childbearing age, a multi-wave-pooled sample will be relatively representative, but at this point, the sample is overly representative of children born to younger mothers. This leaves 866 girls and 837 boys available with data on their delinquent acts.

Despite the problems with the representativeness of the sample, I argue that it is worthwhile to pursue this analysis for several reasons. First, the over-representation of non-whites and children born to young mothers may be seen as an *advantage* of the sample, since these groups are potentially most at risk for delinquent behavior. Secondly, as discussed above, previous analyses of power-control theory are often performed with non-representative samples, so it will be interesting to see how the model performs with a vastly different sample. Finally, such analyses with the NLSY using cross-sections of available children in restricted age-groups are common in sociological and psychological research (e.g. Baydar and Brooks-Gunn 1991; Dornfeld and Kruttschnitt 1992; Hao 1995; Parcel and Menaghan 1993).

Gender role attitudes of the mother were measured with four point scales (1=strongly disagree, 2=moderately disagree, 3=moderately agree, and 4=strongly agree). The following items were used: a woman's place is in the home, a wife with a family has

no time for work, employment of wives leads to juvenile delinquency, traditional husband and wife roles are the best, and women are happier with traditional roles. These questions were asked in 1980, 1982, and 1986; the average of the three administrations was taken to represent a relatively stable picture of gender role attitudes. Within-year alphas were high, and were slightly improved by the summing of cross-year administrations, with a Cronbach's alpha of .86. A measurement model was estimated using these items which fit well.<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 1 for validity coefficients and descriptions of measures used.

Risk-taking attitudes of the child were measured in the 1994 self-administered questionnaire. They were also four point scales. The following questions were used: I think that planning takes the fun out of things, I enjoy taking risks, I enjoy new/exciting experiences even if they are a little frightening or unusual, and life with no danger in it would be too dull. These again had a good reliability (alpha .61) and a well-fitting measurement model, and were comparable to items used by previous researchers (Hagan 1989; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1990; Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 1987).

Closeness to mother was captured with three four-point scales. The items were: How often mother and child talk about important issues, how close the child feels to the mother, and how well the child and mother share thoughts and feelings. Again, these items were quite similar to the measures used by Hagan and his colleagues, and produced a good reliability coefficient (alpha .61).

Instrumental control was measured by two items: first, how many close friends of the child does the mother know, scaled 1=none of them to 4=all of them; second, how often the mother knows where the child is at, scaled 1=only rarely to 4=all of the time. These items were consistent with previous research, but in the current data only had an alpha of .38. Although covariance structure analysis (Lisrel) models do correct for measurement error (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996), such a low reliability is not optimal.

Finally, delinquency of the child was measured by the average of four items. In order to be consistent with previous research in power-control, those items which were of a *non-serious* nature were selected: number of times shoplifted, damaged property, got drunk, and stayed out overnight without permission (see Hagan 1989; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1990; Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 1987). These items were coded from 0=never to 3=more than twice, then summed to a single scale. This scale has good reliability, with an alpha of .68.

#### b) Categorization of Family Class Structure

Based on previous conceptualizations of family class structure and availability of data, families were classified into three groups: patriarchal families with a working father

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<sup>3</sup> The reader may have difficulties both with the fact that the gender role attitudes are averaged across years, and that they are measured so much earlier than the causal process in which they are hypothesized to be involved. To this, I offer some thoughts: if one postulates that the depth of one's indoctrination into a patriarchal ideology is a fairly stable trait across an one's life-time, then averaging should clean the measures of some measurement error. It gets around a difficulty with any snapshot depiction of class position is open to problematical interpretation: what of those who have recently achieved their status or are in transit, and those who have had it for a long time? For example, the ideology, tastes, and behavior of the *neuveaux-riche*s may quite possibly differ from those of old wealth (Bourdieu 1984); a highly educated, motivated, and self-empowered individual who may take a janitor job to pay for law school will behave quite differently from somebody who holds such a position throughout their lifetime. Furthermore, if the model works well with measures of gender role ideology taken over a decade before their effects are measured, then that in itself may support a claim for the stability of the concept. Panel models of the gender role ideology items with equality constraints across administrations also give empirical support to the stability of the measure.

and a mother who is not in the labor-force, two-earner households, and single-mother households. This does not perfectly follow Hagan's "class-in-the-household" conceptualization, but it captures the relevant aspects and follows the classes used in a later extension of power-control (see Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996). Although there may be sources of power in the household other than work status (e.g. Lieber, Farnworth, Jamieson and Nalla 1994; Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991; Simpson and Elis 1995), the non-working housewife family presents a strong contrast to those where the mother is employed, because she is economically dependent upon her spouse. Two-earner households are not the *ideal* egalitarian family, as they may include families with a command class husband (considered unbalanced by Hagen et al. in most of their works) as well as balanced households, but they should provide a reasonable contrast to single earner households, and such a two-earner single-earner distinction is consistent with later works of Hagan et al. (see for example Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996). Finally, within the power-control conceptualization, single motherhood has always been considered a "special case" of the egalitarian family, since there is no male present. There are additional, empirical reasons why this class formulation is useful, as we shall see.

Although information was not available on the supervisory status of the father, there *is* data available for three years on the mother. In exploratory analyses, this led to an interesting finding regarding the use of a snapshot supervisory status question with which to classify families -- supervisory status *frequently changes*. For those 4903 women of the NLSY (with or without children) who were continuously in the labor-force for the years 1988 through 1990, 45% never had supervisory status, 16% had supervisory status all three years, and fully *39% of them changed supervisory status during the three year period of observation*. Of the 723 women with children in the present sample who had continuous employment during that period, 35% changed supervisory status. Whether a snapshot of the "family class structure" is of utility is an empirical and theoretical question for additional reasons (e.g. Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991), but this instability alone makes it questionable.

The patriarchal household as defined by the ideal type of the working father and the stay-at-home mother, while not as stable a configuration as the single mother household, is fairly stable. Over the three year period 1988-1990, 20% of both the full sample and the analysis sample entered or left the labor-force relative to "keeping house," and 17% changed status between 1992-1994. Approximately 8% "kept house" continuously, while 75% worked continuously. Finally, single motherhood, while it does change, is far more stable than supervisory status. Over the three year period (1988-1990) on which supervisory status was observed, only 13% changed into or out of single motherhood, both in the full sample of women and in the sub-sample with children in the analysis, and in the three year period leading to the observation of the children (1992-1994) less than 11% changed status. Therefore, the measures used in the current analysis, while not perfectly stable, are much closer to a stable configuration than one based upon supervisory status.

Thus, as a theory predicting that the "family class structure" should have effects (and lasting effects) upon children's behavior, it is logically imperative that the structure be more than a transitory experience. The power configuration of a household and the roles to be reproduced in the next generation would likely need a more stable basis than authority relations in the workplace. Furthermore, in many cases where one supervises the work of another, especially in service sector jobs with predominantly female and minority labor-forces such authority may not be truly executive-style power, but reflect merely another form of subjugation (Messerschmidt 1986; Simpson and Elis 1995). For

example, a crew leader at McDonald's may supervise the work of others, but this is certainly very different from truly expressing the "entrepreneurial" spirit which lessened control is supposed to engender.

### **Modeling Strategy: Groups by Family Class, Groups by Gender**

#### Groups by Family Class

In their analyses, Hagan and his colleagues broke their sample into groups by family class structure, then examined means across groups and performed multiple regression and covariance structure analyses by group. At times they used finely graded groupings, but more often have used a three group approach -- unbalanced, balanced, and single mother -- similar to the groupings created in the current study. Thus, the first set of models examined will be a simple replication of their methods, with a few additional controls to avoid omitted variable bias. See diagram one for the power-control model.

The current sample from the children of the NLSY is 36% African-American. Previous samples used for tests of power-control theory, especially Hagan's Toronto samples, were likely more racially homogeneous,<sup>4</sup> so race is included as a control variable. Secondly, the age of the child would likely be related to closeness and control efforts, and the age-crime curve is a commonly observed phenomenon (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990 among many), so age is included to avoid inflating the relationship between relational and instrumental controls and delinquency. Finally, the education of the mother is a strong predictor of child outcomes, fertility decisions, and labor-force participation, and therefore was included to avoid mis-specification. Though not a perfect indicator, education of the mother also captures at least some of the potential problems of conflating class with power structure, as indicated by Morash and Chesney-Lind (1991).

#### Groups by Gender

In later analyses, we recognize the wide literature that shows that *effects* of parental controls, socioeconomic status, and other variables important to the analyses may vary by gender (e.g. Agnew and Brezina 1997; Harris 1977; Heimer 1996; Heimer and DeCoster 1999; Hill and Atkinson 1988; Lieber and Watckner 1997; Mears, Ploeger and Warr 1998; Seydlitz 1993), and that it is more appropriate to model the genders separately. However, it is still possible to test power-control in such a framework. Power-control theory's basic proposition is that gender differences in parental controls are larger in the patriarchal than non-patriarchal household, leading to larger gender differences in risk preferences and delinquency. If the *difference* between boys and girls in delinquency is larger in one household type than in another, then logically, one or both of the following conditions must be true: boys must be *more* delinquent in the patriarchal home relative to boys in non-patriarchal homes, or girls must be *less* delinquent in the patriarchal home relative to girls in non-patriarchal homes. Thus, entering family class structure as a set of dummy variables should provide an adequate test of power-control while allowing for a more reasonable model that allows effects to vary by gender. See diagram two for the cross-gender model.

For similar reasons as in the family-class group models, race and age are included as control variables. Furthermore, because the larger sample sizes allowed a more adequate measurement model, the education of the mother, her Duncan occupational score, and family income were used to construct a socioeconomic status variable. This

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<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, as noted earlier, weights cannot be used to correct for the over-sampling of blacks, since the weights are created for the *entire* sample of children based on their mother's sample type, not for the subgroup of children who were old enough for the delinquency questionnaire.

should help to isolate effects of family-class structure from the effects of socioeconomic status (e.g. Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991). This is especially important regarding possible effects of the gender role attitudes of the mother, as exploratory analysis showed that more traditionally oriented women in the sample have less education, lower incomes, and lower Duncan socioeconomic scores (see table three).

### **Summary and Hypotheses**

The predictions derived from the theoretical arguments discussed previously are listed in tables one and two for the cross-family-class and cross-gender models, respectively. Hypothesis 1 is the most basic argument from power-control, simply that gender differences in delinquency and tastes for risk exist, and that they are strongest in patriarchal households. Hypothesis 2 captures the process whereby these gender differences arise, that is, differential controls being imposed, and hypothesis 3 states that this process will completely explain the phenomenon of hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 4 tests the rationale for the social controls being imposed in the first place, and is consistent with an ordinary social control model, as is hypothesis 3 (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Hirschi 1969; LaGrange and Silverman 1999).

Table one: Hypotheses for Power-Control By Family Class Models

- Hypothesis 1    There should be a strong positive effect of gender on delinquency and tastes for risk in the patriarchal household; if there is such an effect in the single mother or two-earner households, it should be smaller than that present in the patriarchal household.
- Hypothesis 2    In the patriarchal household, boys will be controlled less than girls; that is, there should be a direct negative effect of gender on both relational and instrumental control. There should be little or no such effect in the two-earner or single mother household.
- Hypothesis 3    The effect of gender on delinquency and tastes for risk should be fully mediated by the intervening processes; that is, the *total* effect of gender upon delinquency and tastes for risk should be positive and significant, but the *direct* effect should be small and insignificant.
- Hypothesis 4    Control by mothers through affective bonding and supervision should reduce tastes for risk and delinquency in all family types.

Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 are restatements of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 into the by-gender grouping from the logic discussed in the modeling strategy. That is, being a member of a patriarchal family should increase delinquency of boys, or decrease that of girls, or both. Because Hagan et al. are not clear as to which direction gender differences by family type arise, whether through increased control over girls, decreased controls over boys, or both, we will give their theory the most liberal test, and check for within-group *and* cross group effects. That is, if there is a small and insignificant *positive* effect in one group, and a small and insignificant *negative* effect in the other group, this may add up to a significant cross-group effect. Of course, the most liberal test is the weakest test, but since cross-gender attempts to replicate their findings have shown little support, this will give their theory the benefit of the doubt.

Hypotheses 8 and 9 are effectively restatements of hypotheses 5 and 6, but regarding gender role ideology of the mother. If she is acting consistently with her beliefs in traditional gender roles by differentially controlling sons and daughters, one would expect her to control daughters closely (Hagan 1989; Messerschmidt 1986; Simpson and Elis 1995). However, in the discussion of the literature, it was noted that traditional male roles may actually *promote* delinquent behavior in boys (Messerschmidt 1986; Miedzian 1991). Furthermore, if traditionally minded mothers promote risk preferences in sons to prepare them for positions of authority in the workplace, it may be expected that such women may exercise fewer controls over boys.

Table two: Hypotheses for Power-Control and Gender Role Attitudes by Gender Models

Power-control Hypotheses

- Hypothesis 5     a) There should be a negative total effect of patriarchal family status upon delinquency and tastes for risk for girls, or  
                          b) There should be a positive total effect of patriarchal family status upon delinquency and tastes for risk for boys, or  
                          c) both a and b
- Hypothesis 6     a) Patriarchal family status should have a positive effect upon both relational control and instrumental control for girls, or  
                          b) Patriarchal family status should have a negative effect upon both relational control and instrumental control for boys, or  
                          c) both a and b
- Hypothesis 7     Any effect of patriarchal family status upon delinquency and tastes for risk should be fully mediated by intervening processes, that is, there should be no *direct* effect of patriarchal family status upon delinquency and tastes for risk for either boys or girls.

Gender Role Attitude Hypotheses

- Hypothesis 8     a) There should be a negative total effect of traditional gender role attitudes of the mother upon delinquency and tastes for risk for girls, or  
                          b) There should be a positive total effect of traditional gender role attitudes of the mother upon delinquency and tastes for risk for boys, or  
                          c) both a and b
- Hypothesis 9     a) Traditional gender role attitudes of the mother should have a positive effect upon both relational control and instrumental control for girls, or  
                          b) Traditional gender role attitudes of the mother should have a negative effect upon both relational control and instrumental control for boys, or  
                          c) both a and b

Based on table three, means broken down by family class structure and gender, it does not appear as if hypothesis one, that most specific to power-control, is likely to be supported, although, as power-control predicts, gender differences are greatest in patriarchal households. While the gender difference in delinquency is indeed the greatest in patriarchal families (.12 difference, as opposed to .05 in dual earner households and .10 in single mother families), it is not much greater, and single mother households have

nearly the same magnitude of difference as patriarchal, rather than having the smallest difference. Maternal instrumental controls follow a similar pattern (.12 difference in patriarchal, .05 in dual-earner, and .10 in single mother). The only significant mean difference in closeness actually appears in dual earner households, with patriarchal and single mother households showing *no* gender differences in closeness. The gender difference in risk preferences is again greatest in patriarchal households, .22, and dual-earner and single mother households have similar differences, .16 and .15, respectively. So based on means, there is mild support for power-control. A second way to look at gender differences is not means, but *ratios*. This is especially relevant, given that in single mother families, *both* boys and girls have greater delinquency and receive less control than in the two-parent configurations, so absolute mean differences may be larger while the relative difference may be smaller. The gender *ratios* for delinquency in patriarchal, two-earner and single mother households, are .48, .69, and .62 respectively, whereby boys are twice as delinquent as girls in patriarchal households, and only about one and one half times as delinquent in two earner and single mother families. Thus, ratios again show some support for power-control, and the gender difference in single mother families is more in line with expectations.

### **Estimation of the models**

The substantive and measurement models are estimated using the maximum likelihood procedures of Lisrel 8.30 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996) and the mean-and-variance-corrected weighted least squares method of Mplus 1.0 (Muthén and Muthén 1998). While Lisrel is a more commonly used program for structural equations modeling, Mplus allows users to relax the assumption of multivariate normality required for maximum likelihood estimation, allowing for ordinal and categorical outcomes. A common method for handling dichotomous or ordinal delinquency variables is to sum several items into a scale approximating a continuous distribution (e.g. Bartusch and Matsueda 1996; Hagan 1989; Heimer and DeCoster 1999), but with Mplus, we are able to estimate the measurement model for delinquency as well as that of independent variables. The results to be discussed are primarily from the Lisrel models, but since the results from Mplus match closely those of Lisrel in most respects, we may have additional confidence in our findings. In general, the main difference was that a few effects which had sizeable standardized coefficients with Lisrel but were not statistically significant achieved significance in the Mplus models, which seems reasonable due to a more appropriate specification and estimation of the measurement model.

Models fit the data reasonably well. The three group power-control model had a minimum fit function  $\chi^2$  in Lisrel of 286 with 162 degrees of freedom, which rejects a test of *exact* fit, but the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) of .0372 gives a test of *close* fit indicating that the model fits reasonably close to the data. A common descriptive fit index, the GFI (Goodness of Fit Index), of .981 also indicates an acceptable fit. In addition, an information theory measure of fit that takes into account the parsimony of the model, the CAIC (Corrected Akaike's Information Criterion) of 1570 indicates that the model makes efficient use of estimated parameters, since it is well below both that of the independence and saturated models (2581 and 2647 respectively). Ran separately by groups, all fit indices indicate a reasonable fit for each of the three groups, with RMSEAs of .043, .335, and .038, with CAICs all below independence and saturated values, and GFIs above .95. The measurement of most indicators seemed reasonable, see appendix 1 for validity coefficients. While the loadings and error variances significantly differed by group, sensitivity testing by varying the reference

indicator did not alter the structural parameters of the model, so we can have reasonable confidence that the structural parameters may be compared (Bielby 1986).

In the full model with both gender role attitudes and family class structure, the  $\chi^2$  was 887 with 336 degrees of freedom, RMSEA .0445, GFI .952, and CAIC 2294 (relative to 8105 and 4241 for the independence and saturated models respectively), all indicating a reasonably close and parsimonious fit. Again, while the measurement models differed by gender, the structural parameters did not change when reference indicators were varied (Bielby 1986). I present first the results for the power-control by family class structure models, then the models by gender, discussing similarities and differences across groups in the impact of effects.

### **Results of Power-Control by Family Class Structure**

The results for the family class structure models show some support for the central thesis of power-control. Hypothesis one was supported: there *is* a significant total effect of male gender on delinquency in the patriarchal family of .120, while there is little or no such total effect in the two earner or single mother households (table four, column 1, rows 4, 8 and 12). Furthermore, as predicted by hypotheses two and three, this gender effect is mediated through reduced control and increased risk preferences (table four, rows 2, 3, and 4), although the predicted effects through reduced closeness do not appear. However, it is important to note that the total effect of gender upon delinquency is not *significantly* different across groups ( $t=1.22$  for patriarchal compared to two-earner,  $p >.2$ ;  $t=.64$  for single mother compared to two-earner), so these results show only weak support for power-control. In addition, there are significant direct gender effects of increased risk preferences in *all three* household types ( $p <.05$ ), while power-control would predict such effects to be strongest in the patriarchal household, and they should be mediated by relational and instrumental control, *not* direct. This is especially important, since if gender differences in risk preferences are present in all family types, then the basic rationale for the gender differences in delinquency is questionable, because power-control theory sees gender differences in delinquency as primarily a by-product of increased preferences for risky and entrepreneurial behavior that enables males to achieve dominant positions in the labor-force.

In accordance with hypothesis four, instrumental controls have negative effects upon delinquency in all three family types (table four, column 6, rows 4, 8, and 12). As an anomalous finding, this effect is only significant for patriarchal and single mother households, and not for two earner households, although the effects of controls were not expected to vary by family structure. The other half of this hypothesis, that relational controls should lead to reductions in delinquency, is only supported in two earner households, and *not* patriarchal or single-mother households. Furthermore, the effects of emotional closeness upon delinquency in two earner households seems to work through reductions in risk preferences and increased control, rather than directly reducing delinquency.<sup>5</sup> In the Mplus models, a similar pattern of results is found, and in addition, closeness in two-earner households has a significant direct effect upon delinquency reduction. This direct effect of closeness upon delinquency has a similar sized standardized  $\beta$  across methods (-.14 for Mplus, -.135 for Lisrel), so the difference by method seems to be due to more efficient standard errors. In addition, a re-specification

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<sup>5</sup> . The correlation of parameter estimates was examined to see if these anomalies might have a common source -- that they were due to collinearity between the effects of instrumental and relational controls on delinquency -- but the correlation of the effects was not high enough to cause concern (-.337, -.453, and -.086 in patriarchal, two earner and single mother households respectively)



whereby closeness and control are allowed to covary (rather than closeness being causal of control) reduces the total effect of closeness, but it still has a significant total effect through the effect on risk and the non-significant direct effect. So at least for now, it appears that the effects of form of control differ by family type -- instrumental controls regarding knowledge of the child's whereabouts and companions seem to be effective in patriarchal and single mother families, while close affective bonds are more important in two earner households. There is evidence that instrumental control and emotional bonds work differently by gender (Heimer and DeCoster 1999; Hill and Atkinson 1988; Seydlitz 1993; Shover, Norland, James and Thornton 1979; Simpson and Elis 1995; Singer and Levine 1988), which may contribute to this unexpected finding, a possibility that is explored in the second set of models which dis-aggregate by gender.

## **Effects of Gender Role Attitudes of Mothers in Cross-Gender Models**

### **a) Effects of power-control variables.**

In the cross-gender models, the only significant effect of household type was a slightly decreased level of instrumental control in single mother families for boys -- there were *no* significant direct or total effects of patriarchal household upon *any* of the dependent variables, nor were there significant cross-group differences (see columns 1 and 2 in tables six and seven). Because household type was entered as two dummy variables with the reference group being the two-earner household, this is interpreted empirically as meaning that there is no evidence that boys are treated differently in patriarchal vs. two earner households, nor that girls are treated differently by household type. Theoretically, it means that the relationships which logically flow from power-control and were posited in hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 were completely unsupported -- there is no evidence of differential social control within or between genders by household type apart from the effect of single motherhood upon instrumental control of boys<sup>6</sup>.

The effects of instrumental controls in the reduction of delinquency were rather similar across gender, leading to moderate direct reductions in delinquency augmented by indirect effects through reduced taste for risk (tables six and seven, column 8, rows 3, 4 7 and 8). However, the effects of relational controls differed, in that both the delinquency and taste for risk of girls were greatly reduced by emotional closeness, while for boys, there was little effect of relational controls upon delinquency and no effect upon taste for risk. This seems to echo conclusions reached by Heimer and De Coster (1999) regarding the gendered production of violence where they state that the "mechanisms producing violence among females are of a more subtle, indirect nature than those producing violence among males." While their model includes additional intervening variables such as peer associations and the gender definitions of the children themselves, the basic idea seems to be similar -- boys are affected most by direct supervision, while girls are affected more by emotional bonding.

### **b) Effects of gender role attitudes**

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<sup>6</sup> I had concerns that the measurement properties of single indicator concepts in covariance structure models may lead to erroneous conclusions, in that multiple-indicator concepts are corrected for measurement error while single indicator items are generally not corrected. Therefore, I estimated models with non-zero measurement errors for family type (e.g. Hayduk 1987). Sensitivity analyses varying the error from 0 to .0972 for patriarchal household and 0 to .1875 for single mother households (up to 75% measurement error) did not change the conclusions.

Turning to hypotheses 8, 9 and 10, there is mixed support, with some interesting and unexpected findings. While there is no total effect of traditional gender role attitudes of the mother upon the delinquency of either boys or girls (table seven, column 6, rows 4 and 8), they do reduce the risk preferences of girls (tables six and seven, column 6, row 7). This reduction in risk preferences offsets an unexpected *positive* direct effect of traditional gender role attitudes of the mother upon delinquency of girls (table six, column 6, row 8). So it seems that traditional gender role attitudes of the mother affect girls negatively in two ways -- reducing the tastes for risk associated with greater labor-force attainments that are the “brighter side of the theory,” (Grasmick, Hagan, Blackwell and Arneklev 1996), while increasing the possibly harmful activities that are the darker, negative side.<sup>7</sup> This is similar to the effect noted by Singer and Levine (1988), whereby girls appeared to resist patriarchal domination through delinquent peer identification.

### c) Effects of control variables

Additional evidence regarding similarities and differences across gender in the production of delinquency and tastes for risk is also offered by these analyses. African American children of both genders had reduced tastes for risk (table six, column 3, rows 3 and 7). In the context of a power-control model, this makes sense, in that African Americans are an oppressed group relative to whites, a situation which has some similarities to that of the patriarchal domination which produces gender differences in taste for risks and delinquency (Jensen and Thompson 1990; Simpson 1991). Age had similar effects for boys and girls, reducing both relational and instrumental controls, increasing tastes for risk, and increasing delinquency (table six, column 4), effects which are consistent with the idea that as children get older, they begin to distance themselves from their parents and are supervised less, leading to increased delinquency. In accordance with previous research (Heimer 1996; Sampson and Laub 1993), parents of higher socioeconomic status exercised greater supervision over their children, and this effect also was similar for both genders (table six, column 5, rows 2 and 6).

Apart from the effects of gender role ideology discussed earlier, the major difference by gender was that boys were much more influenced by structural position of the family (as represented by the SES of the mother) than were girls (tables six and seven, column 5). In Tittle and Meier’s (1990) review of literature linking SES and delinquency, they state that effects of SES upon delinquency should be stronger for males than for females; empirically they found three studies which examined SES effects by gender, one of which did find a stronger effect for males, whereas the others were equivocal (Tittle and Meier 1990). In the current study, higher SES mothers had greater instrumental control over their sons than lower SES mothers, as well as *increasing* their tastes for risk while simultaneously *reducing* their delinquency. Thus, SES seems to act for boys in a way opposite to the effect of traditional gender role attitudes for girls: high SES promotes risk-taking activities in boys that may lead to greater labor-force attainment, while shielding them from the negative side of risk-taking, delinquency. In fact, SES of the mother was the single strongest predictor of the delinquency of boys (-.334 completely standardized beta), even stronger than taste for risk (.245), instrumental controls (-.158), and age (.109). For girls, the strongest predictor was taste for risk (.384), followed by instrumental controls (-.202) and age (.202), whereas SES had a

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<sup>7</sup> Also, see Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991, where they conclude that “the present findings indicate that if there is a link between the family structure and female delinquency, it is that girls exposed to one face of patriarchy, that of negative paternal sanctions -- are more likely to be delinquent” (Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991). While it is a different “face of patriarchy” that is examined in the current study, the conceptual conclusions are similar, that patriarchy promotes negative outcomes for girls in multiple ways.

miniscule and non-significant effect upon delinquency (-.053). Although SES was introduced as a control variable and was not the major focus of the study per se, this sharp difference by gender and its importance in predicting the delinquency of males is an interesting finding.

## Summary and Conclusions

The analyses showed mixed support for power-control theory. Some support was found in models by family-class structure, but no support was found in models by gender with family-class structure entered as dummy variables, leading to the conclusion that family class structure may be less important in the production of gender differences in delinquency than would be indicated by power-control. Traditional gender role ideologies of the mothers were found to reduce tastes for risk for girls and reduced instrumental controls for boys as hypothesized, but unexpectedly *increased* the delinquency of girls, leading to the conclusion that patriarchal attitudes may be detrimental to girls not only by suppressing them to subordinate roles, but may also lead to delinquency as a form of resistance or pathology. Additional gender differences in the production of delinquency and taste for risk were found, especially that the socioeconomic status of the mother had much stronger effects upon boys than upon girls, emphasizing the importance of including socioeconomic status when examining the effects of family structure and of modeling the genders separately or including interaction terms, *not* just examining main effects of gender.

In an examination of raw means by gender and family class structure, gender differences in delinquency, risk preferences, and control followed the patterns predicted by power-control theory: differences were greatest in patriarchal families, and smaller in two-earner and single mother households, but these differences were not significantly different across family types. In three group covariance structure models effects also loosely followed those predicted by power-control, whereby gender effects upon instrumental control and tastes for risk were strongest in the patriarchal household, and this was the only family type to display a total effect of gender upon delinquency. However, these effects again did not differ *significantly* by family type, and gender effects upon tastes for risk were found in all three family types. In addition, the effects of instrumental and relational control upon delinquency varied by family type, with instrumental control most effective in patriarchal and single mother families and relational control more effective in two-earner households, a phenomenon not predicted by power-control. Note that not only were the two-earner households more egalitarian in their power structure than patriarchal families, these households also had higher levels of education, income, and occupational prestige than either patriarchal or single mother households. The finding that the form of controls vary by family class structure therefore emphasizes the importance of separating effects of the family class structure (i.e. power of husbands relative to wives) from the position of the family vis-à-vis the larger society (e.g. Morash and Chesney-Lind 1991), in that multiple processes may be occurring linking structure to outcomes.

In the by-gender models, little support was found for power-control, in that family class structure had *no* effects upon controls, risk preferences, and delinquency of boys or girls apart from a very slight reduction of instrumental control over boys in single mother households. For boys, the strongest predictor of delinquency was the SES of the mother, whereas there was no impact of SES upon the delinquency of girls. Furthermore, higher SES households not only showed strongly reduced delinquency for boys, they showed *increased* tastes for risks, thus strengthening the skills Hagan et al. argue promote greater labor-force outcomes while reducing their negative aspects. These effects of SES for boys were the obverse of the effects of traditional gender role attitudes of the mother upon girls, whereby traditional gender role attitudes increased their delinquency while reducing their tastes for risk, thus potentially weakening potential labor-force outcomes while increasing negative outcomes.

As one can see from the discussion above, empirical findings in the by-family-class models were somewhat consistent with the power control approach to gender differences in delinquency, but such support was weak, and did not appear at all in the cross-gender models. This points to several possible conclusions, theoretically and empirically.

First, other studies which have used cross-gender models have also had similar negative findings regarding power control, whereas studies by family class have been more supportive – no study prior to this has used *both* specifications on the same data in order to illustrate this point. Thus, my findings indicate that the effect of family-class-structure is very sensitive to model re-specification, as the effect of family class structure is weak, and is closely inter-related with other processes.

Two of these processes that are of particular theoretical importance to the gendering of delinquency are the socioeconomic status of the family in the larger structure of society and the gender role ideologies of mothers. My empirical findings strongly support the importance of socioeconomic status, and although the effects of gender role attitudes were not those hypothesized, patriarchal attitudes of mothers have interesting effects, in that they seem to be detrimental to girls in *multiple* ways. Socioeconomic status and gender role attitudes are in turn closely linked to the phenomenon of family class structure; for example, see table three for mean differences among the household types regarding socioeconomic status and gender role attitudes – whether one was to take these differences to be cause, effect, or parallel to the regular power control approach, further theorizing should take them into account.

This can take power control in two potentially fruitful directions, one moving up the level of abstraction, and one down. First, further research should return to the original, structural formulation (Hagan, Gillis and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1979) of the theory, to re-assert the idea that gender differences in delinquency are the product of a reproduction of the patriarchal-capitalist system, not just domination *within* the household. Second, this paper has also re-asserted the need to examine the social psychological or micro-level foundations of the theory, at least regarding the gender role attitudes of the mothers. Reproduction of power relations within the household and the occupational structure is accomplished by the concrete actions of individuals within their larger context – thus, the attitudes and motivations of these individuals is likely as important as the context that influences them. Such an integration of social structural influences upon social psychological processes leading to delinquency has been accomplished in a symbolic interactionist framework (e.g. various works by Heimer and Matsueda), and it might be possible for further studies of power control to build on this approach.

## Appendix 1, Validity Coefficients (completely standardized loadings) by group and by method of estimation. All loadings were significant <.01

| Group<br>Method of Estimation                          | Power-Control Models (by family class structure) |       |                            |       |                       |       | Full Model (by gender) |       |              |       |
|--|--|-------|----------------------------|-------|-----------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|--------------|-------|
|  | <u>Patriarchal Families</u>                      |       | <u>Two-Earner Families</u> |       | <u>Single Mothers</u> |       | <u>boys</u>            |       | <u>girls</u> |       |
|  | Lisrel   | Mplus | Lisrel                     | Mplus | Lisrel                | Mplus | Lisrel                 | Mplus | Lisrel       | Mplus |
| <b><u>Social class of mother</u></b>                   |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| Highest grade completed by mother as of 1994           |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .385                   | .719  | .401         | .722  |
| Average previous six years Duncan SEI                  |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .385                   | .455  | .422         | .506  |
| Average previous six years family income               |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .857                   | .499  | .848         | .501  |
| <b><u>Gender role attitudes of mother</u></b>          |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| "A woman's place is in the home"                       |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .861                   | .83   | .852         | .833  |
| "A wife with a family has no time for work"            |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .756                   | .807  | .733         | .77   |
| "Employment of wives leads to juvenile delinquency"    |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .589                   | .627  | .578         | .559  |
| Traditional husband and wife roles are better"         |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .806                   | .796  | .83          | .82   |
| "Women are happier with traditional roles"             |  |       |                            |       |                       |       | .745                   | .786  | .72          | .746  |
| <b><u>Maternal Closeness</u></b>                       |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| How often mother and child talk about important issues | .404   | .504  | .357                       | .449  | .413                  | .518  | .415                   | .515  | .376         | .506  |
| How close child feels to mother                        | .613   | .712  | .623                       | .711  | .608                  | .731  | .571                   | .666  | .639         | .718  |
| How well mother and child share thoughts, feelings     | .787   | .805  | .744                       | .8    | .838                  | .864  | .733                   | .777  | .859         | .9    |
| <b><u>Maternal Control</u></b>                         |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| How many close friends of child does mother know       | .633   | .678  | .445                       | .565  | .235                  | .347  | .51                    | .602  | .431         | .625  |
| How often mother knows where child is                  | .581   | .708  | .513                       | .614  | .948                  | .867  | .552                   | .628  | .516         | .479  |
| <b><u>Risk Preferences</u></b>                         |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| Planning takes the fun out of things                   | .445   | .565  | .368                       | .462  | .342                  | .444  | .341                   | .44   | .393         | .483  |
| Enjoy taking risks                                     | .768   | .878  | .623                       | .702  | .648                  | .735  | .694                   | .781  | .604         | .696  |
| enjoy new and exciting experiences                     | .398   | .439  | .447                       | .506  | .479                  | .544  | .516                   | .562  | .416         | .463  |
| life without danger in it would be dull                | .648   | .658  | .692                       | .742  | .620                  | .668  | .684                   | .734  | .592         | .627  |
| <b><u>Delinquency</u></b>                              |  |       |                            |       |                       |       |                        |       |              |       |
| number times stolen from a store in past year          |  | .818  |                            | .739  |                       | .679  |                        | .776  |              | .695  |
| number times damaged property in past year             |  | .867  |                            | .772  |                       | .745  |                        | .761  |              | .801  |
| number times got drunk in past year                    |  | .998  |                            | .943  |                       | .821  |                        | .868  |              | .865  |
| number times stayed out overnight without permission   |  | .672  |                            | .737  |                       | .775  |                        | .692  |              | .751  |

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**Table Four: Unstandardized and Standardized Coefficients by Family Class Structure, Standard Errors in Parentheses, Standardized  $\beta$  in italics**

**Patriarchal Families**

|                           |                          | <u>Independent variable</u>          |                                      |                                    |                                      |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Gender (male) (1)</u>             | <u>African-American (2)</u>          | <u>Education of Mother (3)</u>     | <u>Age (4)</u>                       | <u>Relational Control (5)</u>        | <u>Instrumental Control (6)</u>      | <u>Taste for Risk (7)</u>          |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (1)   | 0.027<br>(0.044)<br><i>0.046</i>     | 0.154**<br>(0.064)<br><i>0.203</i>   | -0.003<br>(0.009)<br><i>-0.022</i> | -0.037**<br>(0.018)<br><i>-0.168</i> |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (2) | -0.164**<br>(0.095)<br><i>-0.145</i> | -0.353**<br>(0.131)<br><i>-0.238</i> | 0.091**<br>(0.020)<br><i>0.413</i> | -0.010<br>(0.036)<br><i>-0.024</i>   | 0.422**<br>(0.217)<br><i>0.216</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (3)       | 0.172**<br>(0.077)<br><i>0.177</i>   | -0.043<br>(0.103)<br><i>-0.033</i>   | -0.016<br>(0.017)<br><i>-0.084</i> | 0.053*<br>(0.028)<br><i>0.145</i>    | -0.660**<br>(0.220)<br><i>-0.394</i> | 0.028<br>(0.107)<br><i>0.033</i>     |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (4)          | 0.049<br>(0.054)<br><i>0.084</i>     | 0.001<br>(0.073)<br><i>0.002</i>     | -0.018<br>(0.012)<br><i>-0.156</i> | -0.003<br>(0.020)<br><i>-0.015</i>   | 0.061<br>(0.131)<br><i>0.061</i>     | -0.157**<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.304</i> | 0.298**<br>(0.087)<br><i>0.495</i> |

**Two Earner Households**

|                           |                          | <u>Independent variable</u>          |                                      |                                     |                                      |                                      |                                    |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Gender (male) (1)</u>             | <u>African-American (2)</u>          | <u>Education of Mother (3)</u>      | <u>Age (4)</u>                       | <u>Relational Control (5)</u>        | <u>Instrumental Control (6)</u>    | <u>Taste for Risk (7)</u>          |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (5)   | -0.052**<br>(0.023)<br><i>-0.106</i> | 0.021<br>(0.026)<br><i>0.036</i>     | 0.002<br>(0.006)<br><i>0.015</i>    | -0.033**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.178</i> |                                      |                                    |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (6) | -0.040<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.050</i>   | -0.081<br>(0.058)<br><i>-0.087</i>   | 0.022<br>(0.014)<br><i>0.102</i>    | -0.035**<br>(0.020)<br><i>-0.113</i> | 0.555**<br>(0.165)<br><i>0.340</i>   |                                    |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (7)       | 0.102**<br>(0.036)<br><i>0.135</i>   | -0.127**<br>(0.043)<br><i>-0.144</i> | 0.021**<br>(0.010)<br><i>0.099</i>  | 0.038**<br>(0.014)<br><i>0.132</i>   | -0.310**<br>(0.115)<br><i>-0.200</i> | -0.126<br>(0.085)<br><i>-0.133</i> |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (8)          | -0.007<br>(0.027)<br><i>-0.015</i>   | 0.071**<br>(0.032)<br><i>0.142</i>   | -0.013*<br>(0.008)<br><i>-0.110</i> | 0.030**<br>(0.011)<br><i>0.181</i>   | -0.119<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.135</i>   | -0.067<br>(0.065)<br><i>-0.124</i> | 0.204**<br>(0.054)<br><i>0.358</i> |

**Single Mother Families**

|                           |                           | <u>Independent variable</u>        |                                      |                                      |                                      |                                    |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                           | <u>Gender (male) (1)</u>           | <u>African-American (2)</u>          | <u>Education of Mother (3)</u>       | <u>Age (4)</u>                       | <u>Relational Control (5)</u>      | <u>Instrumental Control (6)</u>      | <u>Taste for Risk (7)</u>          |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (9)    | 0.015<br>(0.024)<br><i>0.026</i>   | 0.051**<br>(0.025)<br><i>0.091</i>   | 0.005<br>(0.006)<br><i>0.034</i>     | -0.022**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.102</i> |                                    |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (10) | -0.068<br>(0.045)<br><i>-0.140</i> | -0.042<br>(0.032)<br><i>-0.086</i>   | 0.009<br>(0.007)<br><i>0.076</i>     | -0.020<br>(0.014)<br><i>-0.106</i>   | 0.070<br>(0.058)<br><i>0.080</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (11)       | 0.085**<br>(0.036)<br><i>0.118</i> | -0.117**<br>(0.037)<br><i>-0.162</i> | -0.006<br>(0.009)<br><i>-0.035</i>   | 0.008<br>(0.013)<br><i>0.029</i>     | -0.103<br>(0.072)<br><i>-0.080</i> | -0.113<br>(0.078)<br><i>-0.077</i>   |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (12)          | 0.044<br>(0.032)<br><i>0.072</i>   | 0.039<br>(0.032)<br><i>0.063</i>     | -0.035**<br>(0.008)<br><i>-0.226</i> | 0.044**<br>(0.012)<br><i>0.182</i>   | -0.091<br>(0.064)<br><i>-0.083</i> | -0.172**<br>(0.074)<br><i>-0.137</i> | 0.198**<br>(0.061)<br><i>0.232</i> |

**Table Five: Total Effects by Family Class Structure, Standard Errors in  
Parentheses, Factor Correlations *in Italics*  
Patriarchal Families**

|                           |                             | <u>Independent variable</u>         |                                      |                                      |                                      |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                             | <u>Gender<br/>(male) (1)</u>        | <u>African-<br/>American (2)</u>     | <u>Education of<br/>Mother (3)</u>   | <u>Age (4)</u>                       | <u>Relational<br/>Control (5)</u>    | <u>Instrumental<br/>Control (6)</u>  | <u>Taste for<br/>Risk (7)</u>      |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational<br>Control (1)   | 0.027<br>(0.044)<br><i>0.028</i>    | 0.154**<br>(0.064)<br><i>0.204</i>   | -0.003<br>(0.009)<br><i>0.013</i>    | -0.037**<br>(0.018)<br><i>-0.163</i> |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental<br>Control (2) | -0.153*<br>(0.096)<br><i>-0.152</i> | -0.288**<br>(0.126)<br><i>-0.168</i> | 0.090**<br>(0.020)<br><i>0.409</i>   | -0.026<br>(0.036)<br><i>-0.132</i>   | 0.422**<br>(0.217)<br><i>0.173</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk<br>(3)       | 0.150**<br>(0.076)<br><i>0.179</i>  | -0.152<br>(0.097)<br><i>-0.126</i>   | -0.012<br>(0.014)<br><i>-0.103</i>   | 0.077**<br>(0.030)<br><i>0.237</i>   | -0.648**<br>(0.211)<br><i>-0.415</i> | 0.028<br>(0.107)<br><i>-0.11</i>     |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (4)             | 0.120**<br>(0.052)<br><i>0.224</i>  | 0.010<br>(0.067)<br><i>-0.007</i>    | -0.035**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.331</i> | 0.021<br>(0.020)<br><i>0.164</i>     | -0.198*<br>(0.115)<br><i>-0.194</i>  | -0.149**<br>(0.083)<br><i>-0.423</i> | 0.298**<br>(0.087)<br><i>0.531</i> |

**Two Earner Households**

|                           |                             | <u>Independent variable</u>        |                                   |                                    |                                    |                                      |                                     |                                    |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                             | <u>Gender<br/>(male) (1)</u>       | <u>African-<br/>American (2)</u>  | <u>Education of<br/>Mother (3)</u> | <u>Age (4)</u>                     | <u>Relational<br/>Control (5)</u>    | <u>Instrumental<br/>Control (6)</u> | <u>Taste for<br/>Risk (7)</u>      |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational<br>Control (5)   | -0.052<br>(0.044)<br><i>-0.107</i> | 0.021<br>(0.064)<br><i>0.042</i>  | 0.002<br>(0.009)<br><i>0.044</i>   | -0.033*<br>(0.018)<br><i>-0.18</i> |                                      |                                     |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental<br>Control (6) | -0.068<br>(0.099)<br><i>-0.086</i> | -0.069<br>(0.132)<br><i>-0.06</i> | 0.024<br>(0.021)<br><i>0.123</i>   | -0.053<br>(0.036)<br><i>-0.186</i> | 0.555**<br>(0.217)<br><i>0.366</i>   |                                     |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk<br>(7)       | 0.127<br>(0.080)<br><i>0.169</i>   | -0.124<br>(0.101)<br><i>-0.14</i> | 0.017<br>(0.016)<br><i>0.038</i>   | 0.055*<br>(0.030)<br><i>0.181</i>  | -0.379*<br>(0.219)<br><i>-0.289</i>  | -0.126<br>(0.107)<br><i>-0.222</i>  |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (8)             | 0.030<br>(0.052)<br><i>0.068</i>   | 0.048<br>(0.071)<br><i>0.082</i>  | -0.011<br>(0.012)<br><i>-0.123</i> | 0.049**<br>(0.019)<br><i>0.306</i> | -0.234**<br>(0.111)<br><i>-0.314</i> | -0.093<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.307</i>  | 0.204**<br>(0.087)<br><i>0.431</i> |

**Single Mother Families**

|                           |                              | <u>Independent variable</u>        |                                    |                                      |                                    |                                    |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                              | <u>Gender<br/>(male) (1)</u>       | <u>African-<br/>American (2)</u>   | <u>Education of<br/>Mother (3)</u>   | <u>Age (4)</u>                     | <u>Relational<br/>Control (5)</u>  | <u>Instrumental<br/>Control (6)</u>  | <u>Taste for<br/>Risk (7)</u>      |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational<br>Control (9)    | 0.015<br>(0.044)<br><i>0.028</i>   | 0.051<br>(0.064)<br><i>0.093</i>   | 0.005<br>(0.009)<br><i>0.051</i>     | -0.022<br>(0.018)<br><i>-0.1</i>   |                                    |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental<br>Control (10) | -0.067<br>(0.095)<br><i>-0.143</i> | -0.038<br>(0.128)<br><i>-0.079</i> | 0.010<br>(0.020)<br><i>0.073</i>     | -0.022<br>(0.036)<br><i>-0.124</i> | 0.070<br>(0.217)<br><i>0.082</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk<br>(11)       | 0.091<br>(0.076)<br><i>0.12</i>    | -0.118<br>(0.100)<br><i>-0.162</i> | -0.008<br>(0.017)<br><i>-0.065</i>   | 0.013<br>(0.029)<br><i>0.045</i>   | -0.111<br>(0.225)<br><i>-0.103</i> | -0.113<br>(0.107)<br><i>-0.093</i>   |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency<br>(12)          | 0.073<br>(0.052)<br><i>0.121</i>   | 0.017<br>(0.072)<br><i>0.01</i>    | -0.039**<br>(0.012)<br><i>-0.256</i> | 0.052**<br>(0.020)<br><i>0.233</i> | -0.125<br>(0.128)<br><i>-0.14</i>  | -0.195**<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.219</i> | 0.198**<br>(0.087)<br><i>0.274</i> |

**Table Six: Raw Betas by Gender, Standard Errors in Parentheses, Standardized  $\beta$  in italics**

**Boys**

|                           |                          | Independent Variable               |                                     |                                      |                                      |                                      |  |                                    |                                     |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Patriarchal Household</u>       | <u>Single Mother Household</u>      | <u>African American</u>              | <u>Age of Child</u>                  | <u>SES of Mother</u>                 | <u>Gender Role Attitudes of Mother</u> | <u>Relational Control</u>          | <u>Instrumental Control</u>         | <u>Taste for Risk</u>              |
|                           |                          | (1)                                | (2)                                 | (3)                                  | (4)                                  | (5)                                  | (6)                                    | (7)                                | (8)                                 | (9)                                |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (1)   | 0.060<br>(0.041)<br><i>0.073</i>   | 0.013<br>(0.040)<br><i>0.023</i>    | 0.088**<br>(0.031)<br><i>0.145</i>   | -0.026**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.120</i> | -0.009<br>(0.028)<br><i>-0.024</i>   | -0.025<br>(0.030)<br><i>-0.046</i>     |                                    |                                     |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (2) | 0.013<br>(0.081)<br><i>0.009</i>   | -0.130*<br>(0.081)<br><i>-0.132</i> | -0.065<br>(0.060)<br><i>-0.064</i>   | -0.021<br>(0.019)<br><i>-0.056</i>   | 0.098*<br>(0.059)<br><i>0.158</i>    | -0.144**<br>(0.062)<br><i>-0.155</i>   | 0.503**<br>(0.132)<br><i>0.298</i> |                                     |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (3)       | -0.040<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.038</i> | 0.059<br>(0.049)<br><i>0.080</i>    | -0.140**<br>(0.039)<br><i>-0.183</i> | 0.029**<br>(0.012)<br><i>0.104</i>   | 0.064*<br>(0.037)<br><i>0.138</i>    | 0.022<br>(0.037)<br><i>0.032</i>       | -0.072<br>(0.076)<br><i>-0.057</i> | -0.042<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.056</i>  |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (4)          | 0.023<br>(0.047)<br><i>0.025</i>   | -0.070<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.107</i>  | 0.035<br>(0.035)<br><i>0.053</i>     | 0.026**<br>(0.011)<br><i>0.109</i>   | -0.136**<br>(0.038)<br><i>-0.334</i> | 0.025<br>(0.036)<br><i>0.041</i>       | -0.055<br>(0.073)<br><i>-0.049</i> | -0.104*<br>(0.056)<br><i>-0.158</i> | 0.245**<br>(0.058)<br><i>0.279</i> |

**Girls**

|                           |                          | Independent Variable               |                                    |                                      |                                      |                                    |  |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Patriarchal Household</u>       | <u>Single Mother Household</u>     | <u>African American</u>              | <u>Age of Child</u>                  | <u>SES of Mother</u>               | <u>Gender Role Attitudes of Mother</u> | <u>Relational Control</u>            | <u>Instrumental Control</u>          | <u>Taste for Risk</u>              |
|                           |                          | (1)                                | (2)                                | (3)                                  | (4)                                  | (5)                                | (6)                                    | (7)                                  | (8)                                  | (9)                                |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (5)   | -0.024<br>(0.032)<br><i>-0.034</i> | -0.036<br>(0.029)<br><i>-0.071</i> | 0.018<br>(0.023)<br><i>0.033</i>     | -0.029**<br>(0.008)<br><i>-0.147</i> | 0.000<br>(0.020)<br><i>-0.001</i>  | -0.009<br>(0.022)<br><i>-0.020</i>     |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (6) | 0.036<br>(0.075)<br><i>0.030</i>   | -0.032<br>(0.068)<br><i>-0.038</i> | -0.091*<br>(0.056)<br><i>-0.104</i>  | -0.048**<br>(0.020)<br><i>-0.147</i> | 0.082*<br>(0.050)<br><i>0.160</i>  | 0.061<br>(0.054)<br><i>0.078</i>       | 0.323**<br>(0.121)<br><i>0.197</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (7)       | -0.062<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.055</i> | -0.042<br>(0.051)<br><i>-0.052</i> | -0.119**<br>(0.043)<br><i>-0.141</i> | 0.026*<br>(0.015)<br><i>0.083</i>    | -0.026<br>(0.037)<br><i>-0.054</i> | -0.110**<br>(0.042)<br><i>-0.145</i>   | -0.424**<br>(0.105)<br><i>-0.267</i> | -0.197**<br>(0.087)<br><i>-0.204</i> |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (8)          | -0.019<br>(0.039)<br><i>-0.030</i> | 0.013<br>(0.035)<br><i>0.029</i>   | 0.018<br>(0.029)<br><i>0.039</i>     | 0.034**<br>(0.010)<br><i>0.202</i>   | -0.014<br>(0.025)<br><i>-0.053</i> | 0.073**<br>(0.028)<br><i>0.178</i>     | -0.083<br>(0.062)<br><i>-0.097</i>   | -0.106*<br>(0.059)<br><i>-0.202</i>  | 0.208**<br>(0.052)<br><i>0.384</i> |

**Table Seven: Total Effects by Gender, Standard Errors in Parentheses, factor *correlations in Italics***


**Boys**

|                           |                          | <b>Independent Variable</b>        |                                    |                                      |                                      |                                      |  |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Patriarchal Household</u>       | <u>Single Mother Household</u>     | <u>African American</u>              | <u>Age of Child</u>                  | <u>SES of Mother</u>                 | <u>Gender Role Attitudes of Mother</u> | <u>Relational Control</u>            | <u>Instrumental Control</u>          | <u>Taste for Risk</u>              |
|                           |                          | (1)                                | (2)                                | (3)                                  | (4)                                  | (5)                                  | (6)                                    | (7)                                  | (8)                                  | (9)                                |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (1)   | 0.060<br>(0.041)<br><i>0.027</i>   | 0.013<br>(0.040)<br><i>0.067</i>   | 0.088**<br>(0.031)<br><i>0.151</i>   | -0.026**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.115</i> | -0.009<br>(0.028)<br><i>-0.065</i>   | -0.025<br>(0.030)<br><i>-0.044</i>     |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (2) | 0.044<br>(0.082)<br><i>0.038</i>   | -0.123<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.215</i> | -0.021<br>(0.059)<br><i>-0.107</i>   | -0.034*<br>(0.020)<br><i>-0.111</i>  | 0.094<br>(0.060)<br><i>0.280</i>     | -0.157**<br>(0.062)<br><i>-0.190</i>   | 0.503**<br>(0.132)<br><i>0.283</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (3)       | -0.046<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.027</i> | 0.064<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.046</i>  | -0.145**<br>(0.039)<br><i>-0.198</i> | 0.032**<br>(0.012)<br><i>0.104</i>   | 0.061*<br>(0.036)<br><i>0.125</i>    | 0.030<br>(0.036)<br><i>0.015</i>       | -0.093<br>(0.068)<br><i>-0.119</i>   | -0.042<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.050</i>   |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (4)          | 0.004<br>(0.048)<br><i>0.042</i>   | -0.042<br>(0.049)<br><i>0.113</i>  | -0.003<br>(0.035)<br><i>0.078</i>    | 0.039**<br>(0.011)<br><i>0.185</i>   | -0.130**<br>(0.037)<br><i>-0.311</i> | 0.050<br>(0.035)<br><i>0.181</i>       | -0.130**<br>(0.066)<br><i>-0.118</i> | -0.114**<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.281</i> | 0.245**<br>(0.058)<br><i>0.257</i> |

**Girls**

|                           |                          | <b>Independent Variable</b>        |                                    |                                      |                                      |                                    |  |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                           |                          | <u>Patriarchal Household</u>       | <u>Single Mother Household</u>     | <u>African American</u>              | <u>Age of Child</u>                  | <u>SES of Mother</u>               | <u>Gender Role Attitudes of Mother</u> | <u>Relational Control</u>            | <u>Instrumental Control</u>          | <u>Taste for Risk</u>              |
|                           |                          | (1)                                | (2)                                | (3)                                  | (4)                                  | (5)                                | (6)                                    | (7)                                  | (8)                                  | (9)                                |
| <b>Dependent Variable</b> | Relational Control (5)   | -0.024<br>(0.041)<br><i>-0.009</i> | -0.036<br>(0.040)<br><i>-0.049</i> | 0.018<br>(0.031)<br><i>0.022</i>     | -0.029**<br>(0.010)<br><i>-0.146</i> | 0.000<br>(0.028)<br><i>0.034</i>   | -0.009<br>(0.030)<br><i>-0.035</i>     |                                      |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Instrumental Control (6) | 0.028<br>(0.082)<br><i>0.091</i>   | -0.044<br>(0.082)<br><i>-0.176</i> | -0.085<br>(0.059)<br><i>-0.171</i>   | -0.057**<br>(0.019)<br><i>-0.179</i> | 0.082<br>(0.059)<br><i>0.200</i>   | 0.058<br>(0.062)<br><i>0.043</i>       | 0.323**<br>(0.132)<br><i>0.220</i>   |                                      |                                    |
|                           | Taste for Risk (7)       | -0.057<br>(0.054)<br><i>-0.068</i> | -0.018<br>(0.054)<br><i>0.008</i>  | -0.110**<br>(0.042)<br><i>-0.085</i> | 0.049**<br>(0.013)<br><i>0.158</i>   | -0.042<br>(0.039)<br><i>0.000</i>  | -0.117**<br>(0.041)<br><i>-0.120</i>   | -0.487**<br>(0.074)<br><i>-0.321</i> | -0.197**<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.266</i> |                                    |
|                           | Delinquency (8)          | -0.032<br>(0.049)<br><i>-0.067</i> | 0.017<br>(0.050)<br><i>0.123</i>   | 0.003<br>(0.035)<br><i>0.044</i>     | 0.053**<br>(0.011)<br><i>0.322</i>   | -0.032<br>(0.038)<br><i>-0.179</i> | 0.043<br>(0.038)<br><i>0.136</i>       | -0.219**<br>(0.072)<br><i>-0.302</i> | -0.147**<br>(0.057)<br><i>-0.380</i> | 0.208**<br>(0.058)<br><i>0.479</i> |

**Diagram 1: Power Control, by Family Class Structure**



**Diagram 2: Full Model, by Gender, with Gender Role Attitudes of Mother**

